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Abstract 
Are 'modern societies' necessarily democratic societies and capitalist (or: market) societies? 
This is what most of the social sciences of the post-Second World War period have assumed, 
while only some strands of critical, often Marx-inspired approaches contested this connection. 
This essay briefly reconsiders the link between democracy and capitalism both in theoretical 
and historical terms to then advance a hypothesis about the current constellation of political 
and economic modernity which seems to be marked by a paradox. On the one hand, both 
democracy, apparently spreading through 'waves of democratization', and capitalism, as the 
outcome of economic globalization, seem to be without alternative. On the other hand, 
current capitalism is highly crisis-ridden and democracy, at least in Europe, witnesses strong 
signs of disaffection.  
 
In this light, the essay proposes to see the current constellation as the outcome of a 
democratic crisis of capitalism during the 1970s. The reasoning proceeds in five steps. First, 
we will reconsider theories that have assumed that there is a strong conceptual connection 
between democracy and capitalism. Secondly, we will briefly review the history of the 
relation between modern capitalism and modern democracy from their beginnings until the 
1970s to refine the ideas about such conceptual link. These two steps, thirdly, will allow for an 
interim conclusion to understand the double crisis of the 1970s, of both capitalism and 
democracy, an understanding that opens the path to two observations – the fourth and fifth 
steps – on the current condition of global capitalism and the alleged global movement of 
democratisation. First, the developments of the past four decades can be seen as a 
transformation of capitalism in reaction to democratic demands. Extrapolating from this 
insight, second, one may ask whether there is not a basic tension between economic and 
political modernity, given the evident difficulty of keeping political citizenship connected to 
socio-economic citizenship. 
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The democratic crisis of capitalism: 
Reflections on political and economic 
modernity in Europe 
 
Modernity has often been equated with the institutional form of democratic 
market societies, most coherently in the sociological modernisation theory of 
the 1950s and 1960s and most widely by the widespread belief that political 
liberties are intrinsically linked with economic liberties. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the assumptions about linear evolution and likely convergence of 
modern societies that underlie this view were widely and effectively 
criticized. However, the social transformations in the past two decades have 
led many observers back to the idea of an inescapable predominance of 
market organisation in the global economy, on the one hand, and of 
'democratization' of politics across the world, on the other. Neo-
modernisation theorists often start out from the conviction that there is no 
alternative to market society, or capitalism, and to democracy neither. In such 
view, the basic idea of linear evolution and convergence has recently acquired 
forceful new evidence.  
A closer look does not easily or entirely refute this insight, but it does suggest 
that current modernity is ridden by deep tensions, with regard to both its 
economic and its political organization. On the one side, the spread of 
marketisation across numerous societies after the end of Soviet socialism as 
well as the emergence of a more deeply interconnected liberal-global 
capitalism are beyond doubt, but at the same time this capitalism is more 
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crisis-ridden than its predecessors have been since the Great Depression of 
1929. On the other side, the phenomenon that political scientists call 'waves of 
democratization' does seem to have enormous force, having now apparently 
reached the societies of Northern Africa and the Middle East who were 
considered to be unlikely candidates for democracy by many colleagues from 
the same discipline of political science. Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in 
America of the 1830s seems as topical today as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' 
Communist Manifesto of 1848. However, we have also witnessed disaffection 
with existing democracy, at least in the West, as well as a declining effective 
capacity for collective self-determination, as the democratic nation-state loses 
regulatory power when economic and cultural relations more and more 
frequently cross its boundaries. This declining governmental capacity is 
indeed sometimes seen as the main cause for citizen disaffection, a link rather 
strongly evident in contemporary Europe. 
In this light, we need to return to, while rephrasing, some questions that have 
accompanied the analysis of modernity for a long time without being 
resolved. Towards this end, we propose the disentangling of key aspects of 
modernity, elsewhere called the core problématiques of modernity (Wagner 
2011), to discuss anew the relation of democracy to capitalism, and the ways 
in which both can be considered as expressions of modernity. It seems 
relatively straightforward to assume that democracy is the prevalent political 
form of modernity, because democracy means nothing else than collective 
self-determination, with particular regard for the setting of the rules for the 
life in common. The comparative analysis of varieties of modernity, while 
important, can rather safely rest on this starting assumption, even though, as 
we will show, it needs to emphasize the range of varieties of democracy. It is 
somewhat less clear, though, that capitalism is necessarily the economic form 
of modernity. In as far as every modern self-understanding resorts to a 
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concept of autonomy, some authors do hold that a market economy best 
expresses economic modernity because it emphasizes the individual choices 
of the economic agents. At least two qualifications need to be added, though. 
First, market economy is not synonymous to capitalism. The former may be 
conceived as production and exchange by small individual producers, 
whereas the latter cannot be thought without wage-labour, thus a 
fundamental distinction between those who sell labour power and those who 
produce and sell other commodities, as all theorists of capitalism from Marx, 
Weber and Polanyi to currently Hall and Soskice (2000) and Boltanski and 
Chiapello (1999) agree. Second, the interpretation of autonomy as the freedom 
of the producer in a self-regulating market economy presupposes a prior 
separation between autonomy in economic matters and in political ones, 
which leaves the latter, even though its task is the setting of rules for the life 
in common, with nothing to say about the relation between 'states and 
markets', as it is often put. Historically, though, this relation was – and it still 
is – a matter of considerable dispute. As a consequence of these two 
observations, we need to state that both wage-labour capitalism and self-
regulating market economy are specific and partial interpretations of 
economic modernity instead of being synonymous with, or identical to, the 
latter. And this insight opens the way to interrogating anew the relation 
between capitalism and democracy as a contingent one (for more detail on the 
general issue see Wagner 2008, ch. 6). 
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Why should there be a link between capitalism and 
democracy? 
At first sight, there is no compelling reason to think that capitalism and 
democracy should necessarily co-exist. We know about numerous situations 
in history when capitalism flourished under non-democractic conditions and, 
though maybe more rarely in recent times, when democracy flourished under 
non-capitalist conditions. And indeed, the argument has been made that we 
refer here to two historically separate phenomena that, even though their 
emergence roughly coincided in time, have different origins, different 
underlying principles and, thus, different historical trajectories. Modern 
capitalism, in this view, emerges in England as the result of the Industrial 
Revolution (and of the related class struggle, in some interpretations), 
whereas modern democracy originated in France as a key item on the agenda 
of the French Revolution (Meiksins Wood 1999; see also Meiksins Wood 
1996). 
On some closer reflection, however, this view is rather implausible. In 
historical terms, there is too much of a coincidence between the two great 
revolutionary transformations to hold that, despite  some spatial divergence, 
they are entirely disconnected. Both share an intellectual background in 
general Enlightenment thought that had widely spread, variations 
notwithstanding, across all of West and Central Europe and beyond, and 
specifically in the rethinking of politics, economy and society that was a key 
part of the Enlightenment programme. In particular, there was intense 
intellectual exchange between Britain, both Scotland and England, and 
France.  
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If we prematurely discarded the idea of a connection between capitalism and 
democracy, furthermore, we would deprive ourselves of the means to 
understand and analyse the current global condition of modernity. We face 
again a co-occurrence that, even if we may have difficulties in explaining or – 
for that matter – accepting it, is likely to be more than a mere coincidence. On 
the one hand, as stated at the outset, we witness since the 1970s that which 
political scientists call successive waves of democratization, adding up to 
what appears as an unstoppable process. And this institutional change is 
accompanied by a similarly inescapable discourse on human rights and 
democracy. From the 1980s onwards, on the other hand, we also observe the 
global diffusion of capitalism, to which allegedly 'there is no alternative' and 
which in its neo-liberal version is evermore shaping social practices. 
For these reasons, it is more useful to accept the assumption that there is some 
link between capitalism and democracy. Paraphrasing Jürgen Habermas on a 
different matter, one might assume that there is some 'co-originality' of 
capitalism and democracy, that is, these phenomena have co-emerged 
historically and shown somewhat parallel developments since, but leaving 
open for the moment the precise nature of the connection. In a first step, we 
will reconsider theories that indeed have assumed that there is a strong 
connection, and furthermore that there is a strong conceptual reason that 
sustains this connection. In a second step, we will briefly review the history of 
the relation between modern capitalism and modern democracy from their 
beginnings until the 1970s to refine the ideas about such conceptual link. 
These two steps will allow for an interim conclusion to understand the double 
crisis of the 1970s, of both capitalism and democracy, an understanding that 
opens the path for getting a grip on the current condition of global capitalism 
and the alleged global movement towards democratisation.    
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Conceptual reflections: from determinism to structured 
contingency 
The idea that there is a strong connection between capitalism and democracy 
has long existed and indeed accompanied the history of both phenomena. 
However, it has been held in two contrasting versions, namely the conviction 
that there is a natural link between capitalism and democracy, on the one 
hand, and the conviction that these two phenomena are naturally in tension 
with each other, on the other hand. 
The former idea, most versions of which would indeed not refer to 
'capitalism' but rather to 'market society', have their origins in the assumption 
that political liberalism, the normative political philosophy that supports 
liberal democracy, and economic liberalism, the normative theory that 
suggests the enhancement of the 'wealth of nations' if markets reign freely, are 
nothing but two sides of the same coin. Despite their specific origins in 
political theory, on the one hand, and political economy, on the other, the 
notion of such harmonious connection between political and economic 
institutions entered forcefully also into comprehensive social theories of 
'modern society'. The most explicit version of such a theory is Talcott Parsons' 
view of modern society as being functionally differentiated. The organisation 
of markets, on the one hand, and politics and public administration, on the 
other, according to their own logics would lead to a performative superiority, 
and an increased capacity to adapt to novel circumstances, of the society that 
adopted such differentiation. Underlying such view is an idea of freedom as 
the guiding normative principle of modern societies. This wholesale adoption 
of this principle, and its translation into institutions, makes these societies 
both normatively and functionally superior to all other societies in world 
history.   
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More recently, doubt has grown about the adequacy of such theorizing even 
among its erstwhile supporters. In the early 1970s, concern had grown about 
the 'governability' of advanced democracies as a situation seemed to have 
been reached in which the unreserved commitment to democracy led to 
demands on the part of the citizenry of such a size that the economy could no 
longer satisfy the requests, leading to discontent and protest, on the one hand, 
and the economic problems that were then called 'stagflation', a co-existence 
of lagging growth with inflation, on the other (Crozier, Huntington and 
Watanabe 1975). 
The opposite view that capitalism and democracy are naturally in tension 
with each other was held by critical theorists from Marx himself to the 
Frankfurt School of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer to the neo-
marxists of the 1970s. Across all variations, those theories held that a capitalist 
economy formed the basic structure of Western societies, whereas democracy 
was nothing but a 'surface phenomenon' (Adorno 1937, on Karl Mannheim). 
Temporary co-existence was possible, but in moments of crisis democracy 
would tend to be abandoned to safeguard the interests of capital. As 
Horkheimer famously said, who speaks about fascism cannot remain silent 
about capitalism. In stark contrast to liberalism, the underlying idea here is 
that capitalism is exploitative and alienating. Under conditions of true 
democracy, thus, it was likely to be overthrown by popular will – if such will 
could ever express itself fully. 
This thinking, too, witnessed rising doubts within its own ranks – doubts that 
were in this case enhanced by the experience of longer time-spans during 
which capitalism did indeed co-exist with democracy. Starting with Antonio 
Gramsci's interwar reflections on the impregnation of state institutions with 
the logic of capitalism and thus the need for a long-stretched 'war of position' 
against capitalism, instead of a short 'war of movement' with quick victory, 
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much of the work in this strand of theorizing was concerned with explaining 
the persistence of capitalism under conditions of democracy, culminating in 
the connection between 'welfare state and mass loyalty' (Narr and Offe 1975), 
that is, the observation that parts of the surplus value were distributed in the 
form of welfare securities in return for electoral loyalty to capitalist principles. 
True to its original mission, though, such thinking also needed to explore the 
limits of such a formula, which was found in the observation – in parallel to 
the idea of 'governability crisis' – that such distributive politics may have 
exhausted itself and that in its absence 'legitimacy problems of late capitalism' 
(Habermas 1973) would arise. 
Both theories tend to derive necessary institutional consequences from 
underlying principles in far too determinist a manner. Those principles are 
rather open to interpretation and compatible with a variety of institutional 
forms. This can easily be seen by considering the historical fact that – we 
return to our starting observation – capitalism has co-existed for too long 
periods with non-democratic political conditions for the liberal theories to be 
easily accepted, and there has by now been too great persistence of capitalism 
under democratic conditions, even in times of crisis of the welfare state, for 
the critical theories to remain persuasive. Thus, a more nuanced analysis is 
required, and we will propose in the following a brief sketch of a historical 
sociology of democracy and capitalism in Europe as a step towards that end.1 
The question will be approached from two ends, starting with capitalism's 
relation to forms of democracy and moving on, in a second step, to 
democracy's relation to forms of capitalism. 
                                                        
1 European history will be in the centre of the following observations, but this kind of analysis is 
extendable to a global history of democracy and capitalism, and some remarks on Latin America 
and South Africa will be made. A historical analysis of social transformations is required to 
capture the dynamics between socio-economic constellation and political form, which 
comparative case analysis is unlikely to grasp (see for probably the most elaborate such analysis 
Rueschemeyer et al. 1992) 
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Historical reflections: forms of democracy and capitalism 
up to 1970 
For modern capitalism to emerge in Europe, first in Britain, at least three 
conditions seem to have been necessary: the granting or extension of 
commercial freedom that enabled or facilitated both the engagement in 
production or commerce by the employers and the sale of their labour-power 
by the workers – this is legal change often motivated by new forms of social 
and political thought that provided 'arguments for capitalism' (Hirschman 
1977); the invention and diffusion of technology such that work increasingly 
came to mean the operation of machines rather than the manufacture of a 
product – the steam engine is the symbol of what became referred to as the 
Industrial Revolution; a social situation that either required or incentivated 
people to sell their labour-power instead of working for subsistence or 
creating their own employment – the enclosures in Britain are the most 
prominent example of the creation of such a situation. By the early nineteenth 
century, these conditions existed to a considerable extent in a large region of 
the Northwest of Europe, the region of early European capitalism. Inclusive 
democracy, based on the idea of popular sovereignty, though, did not exist in 
any part of Europe at that moment.  
Between 1800 and the end of the First World War, therefore, capitalism 
flourished under conditions of extremely restricted democracy. Until what 
now appears as the 'first wave of democratization' led to universal male 
suffrage in numerous countries, and even to equal male and female suffrage 
in some, the political participation of the working class was highly limited, 
and female political participation even more so. European societies of the 
nineteenth century have often been called 'liberal' on grounds of some 
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constitutional guarantees and the diffusion of a basic liberal imaginary, but 
they were hardly democratic. 
From 1919 onwards, in contrast, fully inclusive democracies developed in 
highly organized form with mass parties, high political mobilization, high 
electoral participation and mass unionization. It is indeed striking to see how 
a principle that had been enunciated more than a century earlier and whose 
application had increasingly, but in vain, been argued for by the excluded 
groups of the population, was suddenly applied in numerous countries 
within a very short period. However, the granting of (male) universal suffrage 
at the end of the First World War cannot easily be seen as a step in a linear 
sequence of waves of democratization.2 Many of these democracies were 
overturned – or cancelled themselves out (Karagiannis 2010) – in the rise of 
authoritarian, in some cases totalitarian, regimes such as in Italy,  Germany 
and Spain, and the acquiescence with such regime forms in the run-up to and 
during the Second World War in Austria, Norway, Vichy France and less 
pronouncedly in other European countries. Thus, 'democratization' was 
followed quickly by a period during which democratic regimes are 
overthrown either in civil wars/military coups d'état or through mass parties 
that gained power in elections but cancelled democratic rules afterwards. 
Democratic institutions were re-established mostly immediately after the 
Second World War. In many countries, they have remained stable since, even 
though military coups d'état abolished democracy in Greece (and many South 
American countries), and in Spain and Portugal the authoritarian 
governments of mid-century were long-lasting, before a new wave of 
democratization signalled the re-establishment of democracy from the 1970s 
                                                        
2 The experience of war – in particular the First World War, but also the Second – is highly 
significant for the transformations of European societies that we discuss in this essay. Intending 
to elaborate a more general reasoning about the connection between capitalism and democracy, 
though, we neglect the consequences of these experiences for present purposes (for more detail, 
see Wagner 1994; Didry and Wagner 1999). 
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onwards. During all this period, capitalism continued to exist, with or 
without democracy, with the exception of the Soviet Union and, after the 
Second World War, the socialist countries of Eastern Europe.  
For modern democracy to emerge in Europe, the specification of conditions is 
less straightforward than for modern capitalism. The imaginary of inclusive 
democracy became available, in principle, with the concept of popular 
sovereignty. But the ambiguity of the term 'people', which could refer either 
to all adult residents or to the lower classes, remained. The French Revolution 
was the moment when the street action of the people of Paris was connected 
with the expression of the popular will (Sewell 2005), but the widespread 
worries about the outcome of the French Revolution led almost immediately 
to the abandonment of such connection, to re-emerge only at the end of the 
First World War.   
Thus, between 1800 and the late nineteenth century (in some countries later, 
until the 1930s), regimes with low levels of participation but strong 
aristocratic and oligarchic features co-exist across Europe with the liberal 
capitalism that emerged from the First Industrial Revolution. Enterprises are 
personally owned; many early capitalists are both inventors and organizers of 
production, and not rarely they see their relation to the workers in analogy to 
the father of a family in relation to children, the company being a large 
household. The spirit of capitalism resides in 'the bourgeois' and features the 
social ethic of devotion to work as a calling, as described by Werner Sombart 
(1920) and Max Weber (1904/5). The formation of working-class 
consciousness, from the 1830s onwards, challenges this interpretation, but 
remains a long time dominated. 
Between 1890 and 1930, that is, during the period of the build-up and advent 
of the 'first wave of democratization', a combination of technical, 
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organizational and economic changes transformed capitalism: the Second 
Industrial Revolution, focused on electric and chemical engineering and 
pioneered in the US and Germany; the 'managerial revolution' (Alfred 
Chandler), separating ownership from management; the emergence of 
'finance capital' (Rudolf Hilferding), linking productive to financial 
organisations; the recognition of unions and the introduction of collective 
conventions; the 'scientific organisation of work' (F. W. Taylor); and finally 
the introduction of a new wage regime, gradually permitting workers to buy 
the products of their own work (Henry Ford). The sum of these changes has 
been described as the creation of a new accumulation regime (Aglietta 1976) 
of a mass-production, mass-consumption economy increasingly being 
referred to as Fordist capitalism. This is the capitalism to which Max Weber 
referred as 'modern' and as the one in which the 'spirit' of an underlying 
professional ethic had already escaped from the iron cage of occidental 
rationalism. It is, we add here, the capitalism that accompanies inclusive, 
organized democracy, but also the one that sees the temporary abandonment 
of democracy in early and mid-twentieth century Europe.   
From the late 1960s onwards, the existing democratic rules were increasingly 
contested and placed under strain, leading to the diagnoses of 'governability 
crisis' and 'legitimacy crisis' alluded to above. At the same time, Fordist 
capitalism entered into crisis, leading to what we now know as the neo-liberal 
calls for de-regulation and, more critically, to the emergence of 'network 
capitalism' based on the 'third spirit' of capitalism (Castells 1996; Boltanski 
and Chiapello 1999). This transformation can be related to the diffusion of 
electronic information and communication technology, sometimes referred to 
as the Third Industrial Revolution. However, the transformation is also 
triggered by increasing dissatisfaction with and, possibly, decreasing 
performance of Fordist capitalism.   
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Interim conclusion: the democratic crisis of capitalism 
We interrupt this brief double sketch at around 1970, because we intend to 
use it for the elaboration of a more nuanced set of hypotheses about the 
connection between capitalism and democracy, which will serve for 
understanding the most recent transformations of capitalism and democracy 
and the politico-economic constellation of the present. 
First, capitalism can exist without democracy. Much of the nineteenth-century 
experience and the – often prolonged – periods of authoritarianism in various 
guises in the twentieth century demonstrate this rather clearly. However, the 
long co-existence of capitalism and democracy in Europe after the Second 
World War has tended to make us forget this historical experience and has 
generated the above-mentioned ideas about the necessary connection between 
the two phenomena. To understand the rather recent advent of democracy, it 
may be useful to recall two insights from the history of social and political 
thought that are rarely made explicit.  
First, social theory and sociology were little concerned with democracy up to 
the early twentieth century. Scholars observed transformations of social 
relations that were captured by terms such as industrial society, working 
classes, capital and the like, but – with the notable exception of Tocqueville – 
seemed to have concluded with the critics of the French Revolution and the 
'ruling classes' that changes in political form were undesirable and, in the 
critical view, unlikely to happen unless capitalism had been overthrown. This 
attitude has had a limiting impact on social theory that can still be felt today. 
This long neglect of the democratic possibilities of modernity, secondly, 
ended only after the arrival of extended or universal (male) suffrage. From the 
late nineteenth century, Italian scholars focussed in neo-Aristotelian or, as has 
more often been underlined, neo-Machiavellian fashion on the relation 
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between the elite political class and the multitude. But only from 1919 
onwards, democracy becomes a key concern of social and political thought, 
starting with Weber's last writings and leading to seminal works by authors 
such as Carl Schmitt, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Mannheim, in the US by John 
Dewey, and by Antonio Gramsci – in some way also Rosa Luxemburg – 
among the few Marxists engaging this topic. Significantly, much of this 
thinking about democracy in the early twentieth century is very open and 
critical. Democracy is seen as a novel political form that is – or at least can be – 
highly problematic. It is only after the Second World War that the conviction 
that 'there is no alternative' to democracy becomes widespread. 
Secondly, whenever capitalism exists without democracy, it will be exposed to a 
critique of exploitation and injustice, likely to be expressed through calls for inclusive, 
egalitarian democracy. If absence of democracy was characteristic of nineteenth-
century capitalism, how should we understand the long dormancy of the 
democratic political imaginary and its breakthrough in the early twentieth 
century? Capitalism is a form of economic organisation that is marked by two 
features that are crucial for answering our question. First, it purports to solve 
the question of the satisfaction of human material needs – the economic 
problématique of modernity – by indirect means, by counting on the interest 
of the commodity producer in a context of production for markets. Second, it 
creates a distinction between a group of economic agents who decide about 
production and another one who are subject to the commands of the former 
group. These two features make it distinct from both the ancient economy, in 
which masters commanded slaves but production was directly oriented at 
satisfying needs, on the one hand, and from (market) socialism, in which 
everyone has a say in decisions over production, on the other. As a first 
consequence, a situation of lacking satisfaction of needs, given the capacity of 
the existing economy, becomes likely for three distinct reasons: deteriorating 
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living and working conditions during the rise of capitalism and exit from the 
preceding form of economic organization; exploitation in the sense of 
appropriation of the major share of production by those who command 
production decisions; and crises of market self-regulation that entail 
production below the possibilities and/or destruction of products that cannot 
be sold. While such a situation of dis-satisfaction, secondly, may in principle 
be addressed by a number of different remedies, an immediately plausible 
suggestion is that all those involved in, or affected by, the existing situation 
should participate equally in improving the situation. More briefly, if social 
problems persist in a context of domination and exclusion from participation, 
then equal collective self-determination – inclusive democracy – is a prima 
facie plausible and persuasive proposal for addressing these problems more 
satisfactorily.  
Some qualified application of this reasoning, we suggest, goes rather far in 
explaining moves towards democracy under conditions of capitalism. This 
holds both for the 'original' and slow rise of democracy in nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century Europe and for the end of the authoritarian regimes 
of the twentieth century. Similarly, one might consider the much-debated 
likelihood of the People's Republic of China's future move towards liberal 
democracy in this light, rather than applying some version of the simplistic 
argument of the necessary connection between market economy and 
democracy, between economic liberalism and political liberalism.  
There is at least one further consideration to be made, though. The preceding 
reasoning may explain why the dominated classes call for democracy, but no 
reason has yet been provided why the dominating classes should yield to this 
demand. To some extent one may be able to count on the force of the 
argument – arguably there is a need for justification under conditions of 
modernity (see Wagner 2012, ch. 7) – but such force alone is unlikely to 
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always prevail. Historically, we can recognize that the dominant class in 
capitalism has in two main ways been dependent on the dominated class. 
First, industrial mass production relied on large numbers of workers who 
needed to some extent to be willing to work, given that this was 'free labour', 
even though Frederick W. Taylor tried to dissociate will and performance at 
the work-place and Max Weber maintained that modern capitalism did not 
require motivation any longer. Strikes have historically been effective because 
the withdrawal of the willingness to work touches capitalism at its core. 
Secondly, emerging mass-consumption capitalism required workers to buy 
the products of their own production, which in turn necessitates effective 
demand in the double sense of having the means to buy and being willing to 
buy the commodities offered. Fordist capitalism, in brief, was the historical 
outcome of the combined effect of the considerations above.   
Thirdly, when capitalism co-exists with inclusive democracy in bounded collectivities 
with strong internal social bonds, pressure on profitability can be high and lead to 
crises. The above reasoning, to turn it another way, suggested that the absence 
of inclusive democracy became a problem for nineteenth-century European 
capitalism and that the introduction of democracy helped easing some 
pressures on this form of economic organization, in terms of both increasing 
legitimacy and solving profitability problems – counter-acting the tendency of 
the rate of profit to fall, as Marx had put it, by creating a new accumulation 
regime. However, the new Fordist capitalism that acknowledged its need for 
support by the masses created for itself also a new set of problems, many of 
which were precisely problems with democracy. 
We can distinguish two historical attempts at addressing this novel problem. 
First, the very introduction of inclusive democracy was fraught with fears of 
the dominant class about an imminent socialist revolution, based on the 
observation that workers' parties and trade unions were pressing beyond the 
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rights to formal political participation for the creation of economic and social 
rights that would indeed have limited the power of the dominant class. The 
early thinking about modern democracy, to which we alluded above, is 
radical and critical in underlining the risks that democracy brings for the 
established socio-economic arrangement because those fears were well 
recognized. The anti-democratic turns of the early twentieth century that 
often entailed the temporary cancellation of the just-inaugurated democracies 
were the first solution to this problem.  
Second, the re-establishment of democratic political arrangements after the 
Second World War occurred under different auspices, to a large extent to be 
explained by the experience of class struggle, civil war and war that preceded 
it. In the most conflict-ridden countries, such as (West) Germany, for instance, 
most social and political groups adopt a moderate, accommodating stand 
towards the re-constitution of economic and political institutions, building 
what has become labelled a 'consociational democracy' in which rather 
different convictions and interests co-exist by virtue of them not being entered 
into the common, collective arrangements (for the term, see Lijphart 1975). In 
parallel, the theorizing of democracy changed form. On the one hand, 
democracy now became central to political thought, making post-Second 
World War political science being considered as 'the science of democracy'. 
On the other hand, much of this thinking was concerned with limiting the 
political passions suggesting, for instance, that a certain degree of citizens' 
apathy is a precondition for viable democracies (Almond and Verba 1963) or 
that organized representation will and should have the effect of filtering the 
more conflictive components of political debate so that they would not reach 
decision-making institutions (see Avritzer 2007 for a highly instructive 
account). 
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Whereas the first experience suggested that democracy may be incompatible 
with capitalism, the second attempt was marked by the effort to demonstrate 
that democracy and capitalism were compatible – drawing conclusions also 
from the experiences of some Scandinavian countries and the United 
Kingdom, as well as the US, where this seemed to have been the case. By the 
late 1960s, however, this attempt appeared to have reached its limits.  
Fourthly, the rise of what has become known as neo-liberal global capitalism can to a 
considerable extent be understood as the outcome of a democratic crisis of capitalism. 
The decade from the late 1960s to the late 1970s witnessed a large number of 
apparently disconnected events that in their sum suggested that, against all 
prior assumptions, modernity had started to undergo a major social 
transformation. In brief, these events are: the students' revolt of 1968; the 
return of spontaneous and large-scale working-class action in 1968 and 1969; 
the end of the international monetary system as established in Bretton Woods; 
the defeat of the US armed forces in the Vietnam War; the first general 
recession of the so-called advanced industrial economies since the end of the 
Second World War in 1974/75 and the rising doubts about the effectiveness of 
Keynesian demand management; the rise of the Japanese economy to world-
market competitiveness; the oil price crises in 1973 and 1979; the Iranian 
revolution in 1979; and the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald 
Reagan in 1980 to government power in the UK and the US with neo-liberal, 
anti-union economic policies.  
In terms of the sequence of events and action, this period can rather neatly be 
described as the move from the expression of a crisis through the workers' 
(and students') demands, the impossibility of resolving it through the 
established instruments such as concerted action between employers, 
governments and unions and Keynesianism, the deepening of the crisis 
through seemingly external events in East Asia and the Middle East, the 
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increasing reception of more radical measures such as monetarism and 
supply-side economics in economic-policy thinking, and finally the adoption 
of such measures in government policies. In more substantive terms, we 
witness the rise of democratic pressures on profitability, recognized also by 
critical scholars (Glyn and Sutcliffe 1972), because of dissatisfaction with 
working and living conditions, now more seen as alienating than exploitative 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 1999). But the outcome now was neither the creation 
of socialism, as hoped or feared in 1919, nor the abolition of democracy, as 
performed in the 1920s and 1930s, but the deflection of the critical concerns in 
a transformation of both capitalism and democracy.  
In other words, the 'governability crisis' and the 'legitimacy problems of late 
capitalism' did exist, but they were resolved in a way that was rather 
unexpected by the early 1970s. The processes we now refer summarily to as 
'economic globalization', namely neo-liberalism, de-regulation, structural 
adjustment, shock therapy, the terminology varying with the specific 
circumstances, entail a relative decoupling of capitalist practices from their 
national institutional embedding and, thus, an escape from the reach of 
democratically voiced demands. This escape means, in contrast to the first 
such experience, that the crisis could be addressed without – except for some 
cases – even temporarily abolishing democracy, but rather by transforming 
both democracy and capitalism. 
 
Liberal society and citizen disaffection: capitalism and 
democracy after the 1970s 
This novel situation is sometimes seen as beyond the reach of critique (most 
recently Boltanski 2009). However, even the current capitalism is not entirely 
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structureless, not merely based on communication flows and ever-changing 
networks, as is sometimes maintained. Its former institutional framework has 
largely been dissolved, but it will not remain without institutional embedding 
to which needs for justification can be attached. Similarly, democracy may 
have lost or weakened its major institutional foundation, the nation-state 
based on popular sovereignty. The realization of the claim to collective self-
determination has become much more difficult in a situation in which no 
evident collectivity exists that both claims such autonomy and is capable of 
exercising it. However, this claim has not for that reason disappeared, in 
contrast it may be more strongly voiced than ever – this is what the idea of 
'democratization waves' is awkwardly referring to. We therefore need to 
review the constellation of democracy and capitalism after the most recent 
crisis and transformation.  
If economic globalization means the relative decoupling of economic practices 
from the nation-state as the historical container of collective self-
determination, this does not entail that these practices are entirely insulated 
from critique and demands, for at least three reasons: First, capitalism 
remains highly dependent on, and thus responsive to, the high-skill sector of 
the labour force (that sector from which demands of the 'third spirit' of 
capitalism arose, demands for autonomy and creativity). Secondly, capitalism 
remains dependent on large numbers of low-skilled, low-salary workers, 
which are now found globally, but not without repercussions such as global 
mobility and demands for global justice. Thirdly, such global capitalism is 
crisis-prone in the absence of regulatory frameworks – globally for instance in 
terms of uncontrolled financial flows, regionally and sectorially in terms of 
adjustments and relocations that generate contestation. 
Recent changes in democracy, in turn, appear to have resolved the 
governability and/or legitimacy crisis that at first seemed unresolvable. First, 
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social demands were deferred either inconclusively, by reference to the 
absence of any alternative to obeying to the rules of the economy, or by shifts 
to other actors, such as the translocation to supranational or 
intergovernmental institution that are less exposed to legitimacy claims, such 
as the European Union or the International Monetary Fund. This 
displacement endangers any commitment to collective self-determination and 
is accompanied by the decline of programmatic mass parties that were 
expressing this commitment within the nation-state form. In turn, we see the 
emergence of a media-driven aggregate-preference democracy that was 
already long theorized by US political science.3 
Secondly, current European democracies are more inclined to accept liberal-
individualistic demands, from 'family policy' issues such as divorce, abortion 
and gay marriage to broader possibilities for individual self-realization in 
terms of practices of freedom of expression and communication of all kinds. 
While much of recent change may already appear to us as normal and self-
evident, we only need to recall the climate of cultural consensus of the 1950s 
and 1960s with shared norms and values created and enhanced by national 
public cultural education and communication such as in state broadcasting 
and public schooling – once seen as an indispensable pre-condition for 
inclusive democracy. The situation, though, is noticeably different in 
Southern democracies, such as the South African or Brazilian one, in which 
                                                        
3 This observation stands in tension to the tendency, often observed, of recent political thought 
towards widening the understanding of democracy by emphasizing deliberation and 
participation over consent and representation. And indeed, this tendency emerged with the 
contestation of existing representative democracies from the late 1960s onwards and has not 
subsided since. Our diagnosis seems nevertheless valid for Europe, or for Northern democracies 
more broadly, given that the emphasis on participation and deliberation remained confined to 
academic debates and, with few exceptions, small strands within the citizenry. In turn, Southern 
democracies present a different picture. In numerous countries, disaffection with democracy has 
not taken place, and the recent advent of inclusive democracy, as in South Africa, or the return to 
it in Latin American countries has been accompanied by high-intensity participation and 
deliberation.   
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the recent introduction or intensification of inclusive democracy goes along 
with expectations with regards to the exercise of collective self-determination. 
Thirdly, this transformation of the relative emphasis on social versus 
individual demands is accompanied by declining rates of formal political 
participation and increasing dissatisfaction with government performance in 
Europe (Offe 2009). The latter, though, is until now rather inconsequential, 
leading to frequent election losses of government parties and the short-term 
rise of populist movements but not (yet) any major challenge to the 
acceptance of the democratic rules.  
In short, the way in which a democratic citizenry is connected to capitalist 
practices can no longer be fully captured by the formula 'welfare state and 
mass loyalty', which applied to the 1950s and 1960s, but rather by a new 
formula such as 'liberal society and citizen disaffection'. The situation 
captured by that formula, though, is unlikely to be stable as it is highly 
problematic, for two distinct reasons.  
On normative grounds, the abandonment of the principle of collective self-
determination would transform modernity beyond recognition. Modernity is 
based on the commitment to both personal  and collective autonomy and it 
requires some balance between the two. A situation in which the latter 
commitment becomes extremely weak does not appear to be sustainable over 
the medium and long run. As what may turn out to be a first example of 
many to come, the attempt at resolving the current financial crisis among the 
European states that adopted the Euro by imposing austerity policies on the, 
mostly Southern European, countries in budgetary difficulty has led to a 
socio-economically motivated mobilization not seen since at least the 1960s in 
Spain, Greece and some other countries. Speaking in functional terms, a 
savage global capitalism will enter into crises that create enormous social and 
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ecological damage, some of which is already obvious today. The 
insustainability of the lack, or weakness, of comprehensive regulatory 
mechanisms has persistently been argued by critics, from at least Karl Polanyi 
onwards, but is now highly visible. Movements for the 'self-defence of society' 
(Polanyi) have begun, reaching globally from the World Social Forum to 
Nobel Award winners in Economics, and the fact that their institutional 
impact has been minimal until now does not invalidate their significance 
given the overall constellation. 
In the near and medium-term future, remedies for the crisis-proneness of the 
current constellation of capitalism and democracy can be found in two 
directions. One possibility is technocratic re-regulation performed by political 
(and business) elites in intergovernmental ways (as sketched and argued by 
Majone 1996 and Scharpf 1999). Such solutions are certainly necessary, but 
they are also very likely to be insufficient and they can and will meet local 
and regional criticism and resistance, because they will be designed in 
normatively problematic ways, not satisfying democratic criteria. 
The other possibility, preferable but highly difficult to achieve, is the 
reconstitution of avenues of collective self-determination. In general, this is 
conceivable as either the revival of the nation-state as the political form that 
created the historical possibility of inclusive collective self-determination or as 
the recasting of this possibility in different spatial terms either larger, at 
regional or even global level, or smaller as the self-defence of communities 
widely visible in Latin America. Each of these avenues has specific problems 
that make it less likely or less desirable or both.  
Global democracy, first, now mostly discussed under the term 
cosmopolitanism, seems most appropriate to a situation in which many 
economic practices have global extension or at least global consequences. 
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However, there is extremely little historical experience of global deliberative 
practices so that the 'self' that is supposed to determine collectively its rules 
barely exists.  
The revival of the national political form, secondly, is in question because of 
the double fact that precisely this form was found insufficient with regard to 
global markets and furthermore saw its democratic qualities weakened in the 
face of the recent transformation of capitalism, as argued above. It may be 
viable under two conditions, though: these nation-states need to be large 
polities with high levels of both production and consumption that may 
therefore have sufficient economic leverage to withstand impacts from the 
global economy. And they need to be polities of forceful and recent 
democratization experiences so that the above experience of citizen 
disaffection after losses of legitimacy does not, or only in lesser terms, apply 
to them. In combination of both reasons, Brazil and South Africa may be such 
cases – much more than the US or, until now, China, which fulfil the first but 
not the second criterion.  
Finally, a regional reconstitution of democratic self-determination is what at 
least partially defines the project of European integration. The rather 
egalitarian federation of democratic polities to face common challenges in the 
present and for the future is a rare occurrence. Historically, we can point to 
alliances of city-states in ancient Greece or in the European middle ages, and 
more recently to the creation of the United States of America. In the present, 
however, European integration is the only case that has demonstrated 
significant advances in political integration and has for this reason sometimes 
be seen as a model for other world-regions, for which though similarly 
favourable conditions did not seem to exist. More significantly, the inability of 
Europeans to act convincingly in the face of the politico-military and 
financial-economic crises of the first decade of the millennium have cast 
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doubts even about the European prospects. As a consequence, the citizen 
disaffection towards national politics in Europe could in general not be 
counteracted by a transfer of legitimacy to European Union institutions, with 
the temporary exception of some member countries, such as Portugal and 
Greece before the current crisis or to some extent Italy, and some policy areas, 
such as environmental policy or gender equality. 
For present purposes, this sketch of possible futures in the connection 
between capitalism and democracy will have to suffice. The actual future will 
be a combination of all these elements with a considerable likelihood of rather 
different avenues being pursued in different parts of the world and with a 
general risk of continued weakening of the democratic character of our 
societies.  
 
A constitutive tension between economic and political 
modernity 
We have started our exploration of the relation between democracy and 
capitalism 'symmetrically', introducing both the argument that these 
arrangements are naturally compatible and that they are in contradiction with 
each other. The experiences of the past half century seem to lean towards 
supporting the compatibility thesis, but we had to introduce significant 
concern about the quality of the kind of democracy that is compatible with 
capitalism. This latter step, thus, suggests that high-intensity democracy – 
inclusive and with high levels of deliberation and participation – does stand 
in a principled tension with capitalism, and maybe even with the predicament 
of economic modernity in general. In conclusion, we want to explore the 
reasons for such a concern. 
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Despite the loss of its model character for creating a new viable connection 
between capitalism and democracy, Europe remains attractive for people in 
many parts of the world because of the comparatively forceful combination of 
work opportunities and protection from violence, persecution and poverty it 
offers. Legal immigration into Europe, though, has been made extremely 
difficult – not to say: impossible – for most people in the world, while illegal 
immigration under often life-threatening circumstances continues in the hope 
for a safe future life within Europe's boundaries. Legal and illegal immigrants 
are currently major contributors to the European economy, mostly in low-pay 
and low-qualification jobs in (often personal) services, mass-production or 
home industry and (often seasonal) agriculture. Many of these economic 
Europeans do not have European citizenship and little prospect of acquiring it 
for themselves (with somewhat better prospects for their children). Thus, 
current European modernity operates with a tightly defined and rather closed 
concept of political membership in democracy whereas it simultaneously 
entertains a flexibly open understanding of economic boundaries, 
schematically as follows: protecting agricultural production, demanding free-
trade for industrial production, and selectively admitting labour without 
granting political citizenship. 
Such asymmetric handling of economic and political membership constitutes 
a tension in the modern self-understanding. It may not be entirely without 
possibility of justification, but it is difficult to justify (for a discussion see the 
chapter on 'membership' in Walzer 1983). If we consider political modernity 
as at least tending towards collective self-determination based on equal 
participation of all its members/citizens (inclusive democracy), then a 
plausible secondary assumption should be that such a modern polity satisfies 
its material needs, that is: addresses economic matters, by drawing similarly 
on its citizens. Such an attitude is indeed expressed when one says that 
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modernity differs most strongly from non-modern settings by rejecting 
slavery, i.e. in my terms handling economic matters through non-citizens 
(Aldo Schiavone 1996 makes such an argument most forcefully).  
If one looks at the history of the past two centuries, the centuries of the revival 
of the democratic commitment in the aftermath of the French Revolution, 
however, such doubly inclusive – political and economic – modernity was 
rather rare, maybe best represented by the Scandinavian countries between 
the 1950s (or even 1930s) and the 1980s. In most other circumstances, a 
significant part of the work for the satisfaction of material needs was 
performed by non-citizens: for much of the nineteenth century by non-
enfranchised workers in Europe and slaves in the US or also Brazil; for the 
twentieth century by apartheid exclusion in South Africa; by colonial 
extraction in general; by imposing terms of trade by military or other means 
such as in the combination of British and then US imperial domination and 
free-trade ideology; and most recently (again) through large-scale 
immigration of people who are not and will not easily become citizens.  
Such historical record seems to show that there is something we might call a 
constitutive problem of modernity, i.e. the inability of the most elaborate 
versions of political modernity to develop an inclusive/egalitarian – we may 
also say 'just' – way of dealing with economic matters. The democratic crisis 
of European capitalism, as discussed above, marks paradoxically both the 
assertion of demands for collective self-determination also with regard to 
economic matters and the exit from a form of modern polity, the inclusive 
democratic welfare state, that developed relatively high levels of both 
economic and political inclusion. To see whether this is a European event or 
signals a constitutive tension in modernity, we may need today to look 
beyond Europe. Brazil and South Africa have radically moved to inclusive 
and highly participative forms of democracy, but they struggle with 
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elaborating an economic arrangement that is consistent with the political 
form, not least: that enhances economic inclusion and reduces social 
inequality. 
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